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Carry, Passive and a New Narrative

I am continuing to work through a new way of looking at the market and so this post will not talk very much about individual stocks. 

In May or June, I started to realize that my framework for understanding the market was missing something. 

I did not really know where to look for answers.  All I knew was that the narrative that I was assuming drove the market could not be entirely right.

Before the virus, my simpleton view was that the market was going up because central banks were supporting it through easing, while the economy was not terrible.  Together this led to expanding multiples and some growth – markets went up.  But I also thought this was probably getting stretched, so I had my portfolio hedged.

Then the virus hit.  Even though I saw the virus coming a little before most, and managed through it pretty well, I was surprised by just how fast and far markets moved down and then back up in its wake.

The word I kept using, somewhat unconsciously, was “tilt”.  I kept saying to anyone who would listen, that this market is on tilt.

I don’t know why I chose that word.  It just intuitively seemed kind of right.  In retrospect, it was more apt than I realized.

Tilt is something that happens in pinball when you shake the machine.  You basically force another factor into the game that the game was not designed for.  It is no longer being played by the intended or agreed upon rules.  In some sense, you have changed the game.

Are We on Tilt?

I know, I know, you can list a bunch of reasons to explain why the market has gone up.

There is the argument I made early on – that some stocks that are actually doing better because of the pandemic. 

There is the argument that the stock market is made up of large companies, while the carnage caused by the pandemic is centered around small business. The biggest companies will take share.

There is the argument that the virus is not as bad as we thought.

And then there is the always present argument that central banks are storming the world with liquidity and that will lift all boats.

I realize all these things play a role. I have used them to varying degrees to inform my own stock decisions.  I bought companies that were outperforming because the virus.  I bought gold on the central bank narrative.  I even sold short names like Ruths Chris, Spirit, and Delta and in June (no longer short any of these) because I didn’t really buy the whole virus is done argument – my opinion is that it has become largely irrelevant to stock prices as a whole – good for some names, bad for others.

But at the same time, I did not feel like these arguments, even taken together, explained what was happening.  There had to be more to the puzzle – what was causing the tilt?

Wrapping My Head Around It

One question that I have always had, that has never really made sense to me, is this – if central bank money printing is causing asset bubbles, then why do the bubbles concentrate in some places and not others?

Why do stocks go up in one place or sector but in another they do not?  Why do a few stocks garner most of the gains?  Why do house prices go up some places and not others?  Why don’t commodities just go up when equities are?  Why doesn’t gold just go up?

In the past I have been fortunate to be introduced to important books or people at the right time.  I started reading Basic Points, by Donald Coxe at the beginning of my investing journey (around ~2003) and he was the perfect voice for explaining the commodity boom in China.  I stumbled on a book at the library by Richard Duncan in 2007 (The Dollar Crisis) which was an epiphany for me.  I still believe it is the best explanation of the international monetary system out there at least for a beginner.  The list is long.

In this case, I was lucky enough to have someone point out a book to me that helped illuminate the cause of our current tilt.  The Rise of Carry may not be the best book on the subject (or maybe it is?) but for me it was an introduction to a whole other world.


There is a lot to say about carry and what I have learned so far.  Many details and specifics, and maybe most interesting for me, the overlap with Duncan’s book – the two books essentially say the same thing from different directions.

But that is for another time.  For now, just my aha moment.  That carry trades do not depend on fundamentals.

Here I found my tilt. 

The game we assume we are playing in the market is based on a rule that we take for granted.  That the market discounts.

Apart from purely technical traders, when an active market participant is deciding to buy or sell a stock, there is some sort of discounting method that informs that decision.  It could be a big spreadsheet, a simple P/E, maybe its just P/S, whatever.

But what if enough market participants begin to buy stocks for totally separate reasons?  What if they are just making side bets? 

These trades would be systematic.  Their decision-making process would not consider the underlying “value” of what they are trading.  They are making the trade because they expect it to be profitable of course.  But those profits do not care about the value of what is being purchased or sold.

Carry trades care about market structure – the market must have a structure that makes these trades profitable.  As long as that structure is there, these trades do not really consider the fundamentals that underly the trade.

Carry trades have been going on forever – I mean insurers and banks are essentially running carry trades. 

Carry became more influential to markets in the 1990s.  At the time it was mostly a currency phenomenon – the currency carry trade. 

So carry is nothing new.  But what is new-ish is how much of the carry trade now centers around the S&P 500.  In The Rise of Carry, the authors call the S&P “the epicenter of the global carry trade”.

The authors argue that carry strategies now have enough influence on the S&P, through selling volatility and clipping the coupons, that carry to a large degree drives the S&P 500.

If that is true then the S&P is being driven in part by strategies that do not discount.

But carry trades are not the only market element that are trading systematically, without regard for discounting, and as a result putting the market on tilt.  In fact, in the wake of my education on carry I was introduced to an even bigger participant.


I was lucky a second time to stumble on the right source.  A couple of comments on the blog a few weeks ago mentioned Mike Green.

The funny thing about Green is that I have a subscription to RealVision.  I have listened to a bunch of his interviews.  He is a regular interviewer on the platform.

But I never really clued into what he was really saying.  In the last few weeks, I have gone back and listened to or read the transcripts of pretty much every one of his interviews.  They have taken on a new meaning to me.

Green talks about the carry trade himself – there is an interview he did with Andrew Scott where they describe the impact of Asian retail investing in retail structured products that was fascinating – but his main theme is the impact of passive investing.

Passive investing fit like a glove into the narrative I was already beginning to craft with carry.

This is an even more pervasive example of a market force that simply does not discount. 

The logic of passive investing is so incredibly simple.  If you give us money – we buy.

And it is big.  Consider the following stats:

  • Passive investing makes up ~43% of the US market right now
  • More than 100% of gross flows into the stock market are passive
  • People under 40 are highly passive investors while over 65 are active investors (20-25% passive)
  • Nearly 85c of every incremental retirement dollar flows into a target dated fund

To me that seems like an awful lot of money that is pretty much ambivalent about what it is buying.

A New Narrative

So here we have a couple of legs on which to build a new narrative.

While I am still not sure about magnitude, I have some confidence that together, these strategies are quite influential.  If that is right, there are some big implications. 

The biggest of these implications is that the demise of discounting leads to a growing indifference to value. 

I hate to get all philosophical, but I can’t think of a better way of saying it: value is existential.  It only matters because we say it matters.  If, at the extreme, every market participant is making their buying and selling decisions on some other criteria, then value, and valuation, has no meaning.

We are not at such an extreme, and I am not really sure we could actually get there, but we are moving in that direction, and that is enough to make a number of other inferences.

Others I can think of:

  1. Markets will become less responsive to economic conditions
  2. Markets, just in general, will become harder to move down (carry and passive inflows should be supportive most of the time) but when markets do move down, they move down harder and faster than in the past (because of A. the nature of carry and B. there are less active investors willing to “buy value”)
  3. Momentum will gain strength – what goes up should see more money go into it – ie. market cap weighted indexes naturally add to what is already strong
  4. A rise in correlation – securities are traded as a group. Differentiation that was brought on by discounting individual stocks is lost.
  5. Cash deployed – active cash is ~5% while passive cash is 10bps so more passive means more cash goes into the market – another support to the upside
  6. Increase in leverage – carry requires leverage and each reinflation of the carry trade is necessarily larger than the last.
  7. Domination by Vanguard/Blackrock – they have an outsized share of the passive market.
  8. Impact of obscure market players – stuff like how regulatory insurance requirements is driving, long dated put buying carry trades, Asian retail structured products as put sellers, how yield enhancement strategies dampen vol and then cause it to explode

There are others I am sure.  I am still working through all of this and there are likely other very important pieces of the puzzle that I haven’t figured out yet.

What Now?

It is too bad that I did not realize this 4 months ago.  It seems so obvious to me now that while I was hedging my portfolio with RWM and HUI.TO short index ETFs, I should have been hedging it directly with long vol.

Long volatility for a dumb retail guy like me simply means being long the VIX.  I am not going to mess around with option strategies and the Greek alphabet.  And like I have said before, the one great advantage of a retail schmo is that I have no benchmark, no expectation of performance. If I lose on the VIX for two years no one is around to care.

The VIX will lose money slowly until it makes it very fast.  Consider that the VIX went from 10 to 100 in March.  If I had been long that with the 25% of my portfolio instead of index shorts, I would have made a killing.

But going long the VIX right now does not seem like good timing. 

We just had the carry crash.  The market has tremendous support from the central banks, and as the authors of The Rise of Carry point out, central banks are the largest volatility sellers of all.  Rates are likely to go lower, or at least stay low.  Inflation is non-existent.    Essentially all the elements that you can imagine upsetting the wheel cart have been pushed off the road.

Meanwhile the VIX is at 30.  I would like to see it would fall back into the teens at least before all is said and done.

If anything, it seems more likely that we are at the beginning of another wave.  Stocks only go up.  I have been very twitchy, selling on the last couple of corrections, but each time I’ve been quick to buy it all back and more as things stabilize.

It is my way of getting comfortable with this new narrative.  I am slowing coming around to believe it.  First that happens in my head, and now its materializing in the portfolio.

With all that said, briefly on my positions:  I added to Globalscape the last few weeks as I found the decline in the stock inexplicable.  I added a new position in Novavax after reading a brokerage report by H.C Wainwright where they estimated 2021 earnings of over $12/share if the company is successful in their vaccine candidate.  I also added another biotech name – Immunic.

This Market Creeps Me Out

I remember something my uncle said a couple of Christmases ago that turned out to be very astute.  It was 2018 and the market was crashing.  We were talking about the carnage on Christmas Day. I was doing my usual “I don’t have a clue what’s going on” routine.  He pointed out one positive was that when it got to be January 1st the passive re-balancing funds (funds that adjust the allocation of stocks and bonds every quarter) were going to buy stocks to get their weightings back up. 

At the time, I didn’t really clue in to how important this was.  But I am wrapping my head around it now.  I’ve read all these Mike Green pieces and listened to his past interviews (he’s on RealVision a lot). His themes are mostly centered around passive investing (which re-balancing funds are a part of) and to a lessor extent vol strategies and carry (which I wrote about last post).  With respect to passive investing, consider the following:

  • Passive investing is 40%+ of the market now
  • Passive investing is 100%+ of flows – in other words it represents more than 100% of the new money coming into the market (this is because millennials are almost entirely passive investors

You add carry strategies on top of this (some of which are probably already included in that 40% bucket but others are not) and you can start to paint a picture of what is happening in the market.

Consider that there is no decision making process in passive investing.  There is no analysis of valuation, of the future prospects of a business or the economy. As Mike Green points out, the basic rule of these funds is: if new money comes in, buy.

Now add to that the impact of the carry trades (short volatility and others) that I have alluded to in my last post. These strategies aren’t driven by a value assessment of the market either (at least not in a fundamental way).

Carry trades are more like side-bets. They add liquidity and momentum, but they don’t assess value. All they really care about is that their return is there. They just want to clip the coupon.

Add it up and you can imagine how, as these strategies take on more weight, that more of the market becomes driven by forces that simply do not care about reality.

To think about the impact consider this thought experiment that Mike Green makes: assume 100% of the market is passively invested. Now $1 of new money comes into the market.  What happens to the market?  It hits an asymptote – there is no seller.   Passive funds don’t sell because of valuation.  The market keeps going up and there is still no seller, unless someone pulls their money out.  The opposite applies as well.

Obviously this isn’t realistic but it illustrates the general point of what happens as these factors gain influence.

It’s crazy.  But I think it helps explain why some of the market seems to be divorced from what might makes sense right now.  And maybe why the market as a whole doesn’t really make sense right now (though as I’ve written about before, I’m not totally sold on that).

For me, I don’t have to map this out 100%. It doesn’t matter if such-and-such nuance is flawed or so-and-so nuance hasn’t been considered. All that matters for my market decisions is to weight the potential that the above assessment is right, and let that weighting influence my buying and selling decisions.

I am definitely putting some weight on the idea. I think that over time this dynamic means higher prices than what we would otherwise have. I think it means momentum continues to do better (though right now, I mean my goodness!). And I think volatility is going to be higher than you’d expect, maybe even as stocks do well.

What it means practically is that I have to take a little off my hedges. Which I did on Friday. But I also took off my longs as well. I just lowered exposure.

Now, you might point out that if I really believed the above, the right thing to do would be to just say F-it, add to longs, dump the index shorts. Stocks only go up right?

But, I am reluctant to do that. I am weighing the option against something else I suspect is going to happen: that while the market may have the inclination to move higher, it will also become more volatile. So I have to be careful about becoming stretched, regardless of what I might believe the eventual direction to be. That 7% correction we had a few weeks ago makes perfect sense in this environment. It might portend to the future – these kind of extremely sharp but short-lived corrections could become the norm. I need to be careful about my exposure to that.

There is weird stuff going on:

Maybe the better way of explaining why I am reducing exposure is simply: this market creeps me out. Like I feel really, really uneasy about it – and not because I think a crash is imminent – it more just feels like the wheels are coming off. I said a couple months ago I could see 4,000 or 2,000 on the S&P. That feeling is as strong as ever right now.

Week 471: Siding with Carry

Portfolio Performance

Thoughts and Review

I finished reading the book The Rise of Carry.  It was recommended in a comment a couple of weeks ago.  I thought it was a really good book.  It made sense of some things that were already floating around in my head and that I’ve written about lately but where there were details and mechanics that I didn’t really understand.  I’m actually reading the book for a second time right now because there is still a lot of it that I’m fuzzy on, but I’m going to write about what it has made clear to me.

The book’s big picture idea is really simple.   The authors believe that markets are now being driven by carry trades, that this is the main mover of financial markets (more so than the economy) and that one carry trade in particular, the S&P volatility carry trade, has become so ubiquitous that it is driving all markets together.

So what are carry trades?  Carry trades are financial transactions that make money when nothing happens.  The authors describe them as the financial equivalent of selling insurance.  They are usually leveraged.   They add liquidity to the market.  They tend to follow a pattern of long periods of stable returns followed by sharp, sudden draw downs.

Another way of saying this is to say that carry trades sell volatility.  Volatility is a measure of how much a market goes up and down.  How volatile it is.  “Selling volatility” means that you are making a bet that the market won’t change by very much, or at least that changes will be gradual.

The pattern of these trades follow the patterns we are seeing more and more in markets.  Long periods where basically nothing happens (stocks go up slowly), followed by sharp collapses like what happened at the end of 2018 or what happened in February and March of this year.

The argument made by the authors is that these patterns are being caused not by economic considerations (the market isn’t going up and down on hopes of an economic boom or fear of a recession)

Carry trades are a natural part of the financial market.  Most of the time they act as a way to help capital get allocated to where it is needed.  What makes the current period unique is that central banks have greased the wheels of carry-trades.   The unlimited liquidity that they have provided has created a “put” (a put is something that limits losses if markets start to fall) that has allowed the carry trade to morph into something with a much larger influence on markets and the economy than has ever been the case in the past.

Carry trades started out as a currency phenomenon – in the 1990s and early 2000s most carry trades centered around currencies.  They took advantage of interest rates spreads between countries to sell one currency (usually the yen or dollar), to buy another (such as the currency of Australia or an emerging market).  They would then use that currency to buy high yielding debt instruments from that country.

More recently carry trades have moved into the stock market.  This change occurred after the Great Financial Crisis of 2008. Today the biggest carry trade out there is to short volatility on the S&P.

Through the book they argue, and use data to back it up, that carry trades – ie. selling volatility and specifically selling S&P volatility, as a source of leverage – has become the driving force of markets.  Its influence has gotten to a point where carry-trade induced draw downs of the stock market drive economic events, rather than vice versa.

This is a really important conclusion.  If its true, then everything we know about why markets go up and down is wrong.  It explains why the markets seem to be indifferent to what is actually going on in the economy right now.

If the view is true markets will follow a typical carry-trade like pattern: we are likely to have long periods of slowly rising markets followed by steep, short squeeze induced, crashes.

We just saw one of those crashes.  The book makes clear that every crash must be followed up by a doubling down on the “put” by central banks. If not, the entire carry-trade centric regime risks deflating for good (the consequences of this would not be good for anyone).  In this crash, like all the others in the last 25 years, central banks rose to the occasion, once again came to the rescue, supplying massive liquidity to get the carry-trade back on its feet.

Another important point relevant to the present moment is that the central banks just doubled down again.  It seems unlikely to me that we will have another crash so soon after this.  The carry trade bubble needs to inflate again, and then, once liquidity is tapered off, another crash will come.

Each successive reflation of the carry-trade makes it bigger.  The authors describe it to be analogous to a Ponzi scheme.  Each time a Ponzi scheme is on the verge of collapse, it must get even bigger if it is going to survive (it needs enough new capital to pay out the existing holders).  The carry-trade regime that we are in has many similarities to a Ponzi scheme and this is one of them.

A lot of what the book says is what I have already suspected but haven’t had the tools to put my finger on.  It is very worthwhile to read for that reason.  It reinforces my thought from the last couple of posts – that A. Portnoy is right and B. you don’t want to try to short this market.  It also reinforces my resolve that at some point this will not end well.

We may be at ridiculous valuations and speculation may be rampant, but given that the carry-trade is back in full swing – ie. that central banks have provided the liquidity to give it another lap around the track – I’m not sure if the market can fall far from here.  We could get another 10% drop like we saw a few weeks ago, but if the authors are right (and what they are saying feels right to me) that dip would be bought.  Until there is a liquidity event that will “shock” the S&P volatility carry-trade (and to be clear, I am saying a liquidity event, not an economic event or even, I suspect, a rising hospitalizations event), it is all systems go for the market – economy be damned.

My gut tells me that the smart decision would be to lighten up on shorts and let the longs ride. That would be the path to greatest returns.  What I’ve read in this book only enhances that intuition.  Like I said in my last post – I suspect that Portney is right – stocks really should only go up right now.  And not because of the economy, not because of valuation and not because it makes any kind of historical sense, but simply because the carry trade is alive and well again, that volatility selling is self-reinforcing until it is not, and that all this engenders a rising S&P, which floats all boats.

So that is what I probably should do.  If this was 2011 and I was where I was then, I probably would do that.  But I’m in a little different spot now.  I’m more willing to let some gains get away in return for a little less stress and a little more piece of mind.

I have to follow my process.  So while I may lighten up on my index shorts on the next correction, relying on my suspicion that we can’t fall too far with the central bank put in place (which, after reading this book, is truly aptly named), I’m not going to go all in.

If my gut is right this will mean that I will continue to lose money on the index shorts and that will be a headwind to my performance. That puts more pressure on my stock picking, which is fine.  My shorts are my own put on the put.  The book points out in its somewhat depressing conclusion that the eventual conclusion to all of this is not all that rosy.  It is likely that each successive resurrection of the S&P carry trade will lead to successively larger collapses until eventually the whole system is put into question – ie. that we question the legitimacy of the central bank put itself.

We are probably a long way from that point, but I will sleep better knowing that I have my own put against it anyway, even if it comes at the cost of some return.

In the mean time, what this means is that the Robinhooders are probably right.  There is no sense in looking for value, deep analysis of businesses or weighing the economy as elements in stock selection.  Or at least, those considerations are secondary to the question that really matters – what is most likely to go up?

That statement may sound superfluous at first glance, but I don’t think it is.  What it is saying is that instead of picking a stock that might seem undervalued and waiting for the market to see that value, you are better off (in this market) to look for the stocks that others are likely to buy, before they buy them, and don’t pay too much attention to what it “should” be worth.

I suspect that this may be exaggerated even more than it might have been because of the unique environment caused by the pandemic.  Like I wrote about in my post about the bi-furcated economy, some indsutries are basically knee-capped by the pandemic, which means that even more money must flow into the sectors that remain viable.

I am trying to take advantage of this idea with a few small purchases.  I don’t have the stomach or the tools to gear my portfolio to this on a larger scale, but I’ll wade in where I can.  I stepped into this a little with a purchase of Graf Industrial a couple of weeks ago.

I actually bought the stock for totally the wrong reason.  I liked the potential acquisition of a plastics recycling technology firm that they said they were going to buy.  While not named in the press release, seemed almost assured to be a company called PureCycle.  PureCycle has a very cool technology that lets you turn a plastic container back into virgin resin.  This allows you to take a #5 yogurt container and recycle it into another #5 yogurt container.  In the world of plastic recycling this is a real game changer.

Like all SPACs I did not know what Graf was paying for PureCycle, nor did I know anything about PureCycle’s financials apart from a few tidbits I could gleen from their website.  But, as the previously mentioned axiom implies, who cares!  It is not the valuation but the likelihood that it will go up that matters right now.

Of course what ended up happening is that instead of buying PureCycle Graf decided to buy Velodyne LiDAR.   LiDAR is autonomous driving and next-gen driving technology is even hipper than recycling right now.  The stock shot up.

I wasn’t smart enough to hold on for the entire ride, but I caught a few points before I sold out.  Ironically, I sold way too soon (at around $15-$16 instead of $20+) because (in my opinion) I knew too much.  I have followed Foresight Autonomous for a while, and while the technology is different and the applications not entirely the same, there was enough overlap, and I’ve seen Foresight struggle for long enough, that I was skeptical of the eventual ability of the business to generate growth.

It is only in a market like this where experience, and therefore skepticism, is a handicap.

I have 3 other plays that I would characterize as being along the say line as Graf Industrial.  I’m not sure what the right word is for these ideas, momentum or greater fool or just stocks that I think have a good chance of going up regardless of whether I think they should or not.

The first is AYRO, which was a Rev Shark stock of the week pick on Sunday.  I looked at the stock on Monday and at first I wasn’t very interested. It popped hard on Monday morning, maybe because of the Rev Shark recommendation but more likely because of news that they had completed a factory expansion which, from what I could tell, was just a recycling of what was already in their filings.

But after the company announced a registered direct offering for $4.75, I changed my tune.

There is a lot I don’t like about this stock – again these are trades to try to take advantage of the market we seem to be in, not investments where I have confidence they can stand on their own merit.  AYRO produces low-speed vehicles – these are kind of like golf carts with flat beds, pickups or boxes.   They only do the final assembly – there is a Chinese company that manufactures and holds patents on the products.  AYRO only has rights for sale in the US and Canada.  They sell their vehicles through another third party – Club Cart, which is the golf cart maker owned by Ingersoll Rand.  I have to wonder – why doesn’t Ingersoll Rand just build their own?

But who cares.  My thesis here is simple.  Someone was willing to do a deal at $4.75 yesterday for $15 million.  This comes two weeks after a deal was done at $2.50 for $5 million.  Something doesn’t add up about that unless whoever did the deal yesterday believed they needed to be in the stock regardless of what they paid.

I have no idea why they would pay so much.  The only thing I have been able to dig up is that Ingersoll Rand Industrial was bought by a company called Gardner Denver and the Club Cart business does not really fit with the rest of the portfolio (which is indutrial valves and compression fluids and such).  Barclays said a couple of months ago that they think Club Cart is going to be divested.  This is something, but I’m not sure what, and the links to any positive move in AYRO are tenuous I admit.  But AYRO has a market cap of $85 million or so – in the land of EV’s where no valuation is too high right now, this is a pretty low base to start from.

My second purchase was Envision Solar.  This is a stock that @IPHawk has been talking about on twitter for a while.  Envision makes solar powered electrical charging stations.  The thesis here shares a few traits with AYRO – first, the market capitalization of Envision Solar is $70 million – so there is plenty of room to run on speculation.  Second, like Ayro, Envision raised a bunch of money ($10 million) and the stock went higher after it did.  Third – its EV’s and solar. In this market, that’s enough for me.

My third purchase is a bit of a different take on things.  I bought YRC Worldwide.  I realize the company is pretty dismal, and that the trucking industry is not exactly one of those pandemic-proof businesses that I have tried to steer myself to, but on the other hand YRCW just got $700 million of low-interest debt.  Apart from their pension liabilities, this is basically 100% of their existing outstanding debt.  That doesn’t mean that they will pay back their debt with this debt or anything like that, but it gives them a whole lot of runway to do something.  Anything.  Another restructuring, buy some new trucks, maybe add technology to improve efficiencies.  Will they be successful?  Probably not.  Will the stock go to $5 before that turns out to be the case?  In this market, and given that the market capitalization is only around $100 million, I think that is a reasonable possibility.

I talked about most of my other stocks in my last post so I won’t go through those details again.   I sold Overstock yesterday, which looks to have been a mistake, seeing that the stock is up another 15% today.  I also bought a bunch more Slack Technologies, which may see another pop if the virus escalation continues (this is part of my thesis that stocks will go up and that the money chasing them will have to go into companies like Slack that are doing well, regardless of their valuation).   The only other names I considered mentioning here were the small basket of biotechs that I have been holding.  These have done pretty well on whole, but yesterday I was whacked very hard by the Phase 2 results from Obseva – the stock fell 50% and today it is falling again.   Anyway, this tempers my enthusiasm because, and I have said this before with respect to biotechs, what the hell do I know?  Not much.

Portfolio Composition

Click here, here and here for the last nine weeks of trades.